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Abstract
In military and rescue applications of mobile ad hoc networks, all the nodes belong to
the same authority; therefore, they are motivated to cooperate in order to support the
basic functions of the network. In this paper, we consider the case when each node is its
own authority and tries to maximize the benets it gets from the network. More precisely,
we assume that the nodes are not willing to forward packets for the benet of other nodes.
This problem may arise in civilian applications of mobile ad hoc networks. In order to
stimulate the nodes for packet forwarding, we propose a simple mechanism based on a
counter in each node. We study the behavior of the proposed mechanism analytically and
by means of simulations, and detail the way in which it could be protected against misuse.
1 Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network is a wireless multi-hop network formed by a set of mobile nodes in
a self-organizing way without relying on any established infrastructure. Due to the absence
of infrastructure, in a mobile ad hoc network, all networking functions must be performed by
the nodes themselves. For instance, packets sent between two distant nodes are expected to
be forwarded by intermediate nodes [7, 13].
The above mentioned operating principle renders cooperation among nodes an essential
requirement in a mobile ad hoc network. By cooperation, we mean that the nodes perform
networking functions for the benet of other nodes. Lack of cooperation may have fatal eects
on the performance of the network. As an example, let us consider Figure 1, which illustrates
that the throughput of the network decreases dramatically as the fraction of the nodes that
deny packet forwarding increases. The dierent curves belong to networks of dierent sizes
(100, 200, 300, and 400 nodes) but with the same node density. The gure also shows that
larger networks are more sensitive to this kind of non-cooperative behavior of the nodes.
These results are based on our own simulations described in detail in Section 4, but similar
results have been presented in [11] as well.
So far, applications of mobile ad hoc networks have been envisioned mainly for crisis
situations (e.g., in the battleeld or in rescue operations). In these applications, all the nodes
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Figure 1: The eect of non-cooperating nodes on the throughput of the network
of the network belong to a single authority (e.g., a single platoon or rescue team) and have a
common goal. For this reason, the nodes are naturally motivated to cooperate.
However, with the progress of technology, it will soon be possible to deploy mobile ad hoc
networks for civilian applications as well. Examples include networks of cars and provision
of communication facilities in remote areas. In these networks, the nodes typically do not
belong to a single authority and they do not pursue a common goal. In addition, these
networks could be larger and could have a longer lifetime, and they could be completely
self-organizing, meaning that the network would run solely by the operation of the end-users.
In such networks, there is no good reason to assume that the nodes cooperate. Indeed, the
contrary is true: in order to save battery power, the nodes tend to be \selsh".
As a motivating example, let us consider packet forwarding again: Even in a small ad
hoc network, most of the energy of a given node is likely to be devoted to forwarding packets
for the benet of other nodes. For instance, if the average number of hops from source to
destination is around 5, then approximately 80% of the energy devoted to sending packets
will be consumed by packet forwarding. Hence, turning the forwarding function o would
very noticeably extend the battery life of a node, and increase its overall availability for its
user.
In this paper, we address the problem of stimulating cooperation in self-organizing, mobile
ad hoc networks for civilian applications. We assume that each node belongs to a dierent
authority, its user, which has full control over the node. In particular, the user can tamper with
the software and the hardware of the node, and modify its behavior in order to better adapt
it to her own goals (e.g., to save battery power). We understand that regular users usually
do not have the required level of knowledge and skills to modify their nodes. Nevertheless,
our assumption is still reasonable, because criminal organizations can have enough interest
and resources to reverse engineer a node and sell tampered nodes with modied behavior on
a large scale. The experience of cellular networks shows that as soon as the nodes are under
the control of the end-users, there is a strong temptation to alter their behavior in one way
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or another.
Our approach to alleviate this problem is based on a trusted and tamper resistant hardware
module, called security module, in each node and cryptographic protection of packets. As
opposed to the node itself, the security module cannot be tampered with by the user. One
can think of the security module as a smart card (similar to the SIM card in GSM phones)
or as a tamper resistant security co-processor. Our design ensures that while the user can
still modify the behavior of the node (but not the security module), she cannot gain any
advantages by doing so. Thus, tampering with nodes is uninteresting, and should happen
only rarely.
We focus on the stimulation of packet forwarding, which is a fundamental networking
function that the nodes should perform in a mobile ad hoc network. In a nutshell, we propose
a protocol that requires the node to pass each packet (generated as well as received for for-
warding) to its security module. The security module maintains a counter, which is decreased
when the node wants to send a packet as originator, and increased when the node forwards a
packet. The value of the counter must remain positive, which means that if the node wants
to send its own packets, then it must forward packets for the benet of other nodes. The
counter is protected from illegitimate manipulation by the tamper resistance of the security
module.
Besides stimulating packet forwarding, our mechanism encourages the users to keep their
nodes turned on and to refrain from sending a large amount of packets to distant destina-
tions. The latter property is particularly desirable, because, as mentioned in [8], the available
bandwidth per node declines as the number of nodes increases (assuming that the trac does
not exhibit locality properties).
The present proposal was developed in the framework of the Terminodes Project [4, 9]
(www.terminodes.org). However, it is generic; in particular, it could work in conjunction with
any routing algorithm.
The outline of the paper is the following: In Section 2, we describe the proposed mechanism
to stimulate packet forwarding, and study its behavior through the analysis of a simple model.
In Section 3, we detail the ways in which the proposed mechanism could be protected against
misuse. In Section 4, we describe our simulation settings, and the results that we obtained.
Finally, in Section 5, we report on some related work, and in Section 6, we conclude the paper.
2 Stimulation mechanism
We assume that each node has a counter, called credit counter, and the following rules are
enforced:
1. When the node wants to send one of its own packets, the number n of intermediate
nodes that are needed to reach the destination is estimated. If the credit counter of the
node is greater than or equal to n, then the node can send its packet, and the credit
counter is decreased by n. Otherwise, the node cannot send its packet, and the credit
counter is not modied.
2. When the node forwards a packet for the benet of other nodes, the credit counter is
increased by one.
Let us consider now the following model, the analysis of which will give an insight into the
operation of the above mechanism. A node has two incoming and two outgoing ows of packets
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(Figure 2). The incoming ow IN
o
represents the packets that are generated by the node
itself. We call these packets own packets. The other incoming ow IN
f
represents the packets
that are received for forwarding. We call these packets forwarding packets. The packets that
the node receives as destination are not represented in the model. Each incoming packet
(own as well as forwarding) is either sent or dropped. The outgoing ow OUT represents the
packets that are sent by the node. This ow consists of two components OUT
o
and OUT
f
,
where OUT
o
represents the own packets that are sent and OUT
f
stands for the forwarded
packets. The other outgoing ow DRP represents the packets that are dropped. Similarly
to OUT , this ow consists of two components too: DRP
o
and DRP
f
, representing dropped
own and forwarding packets, respectively.
B, C, N
oIN
INf
=OUT oOUT OUTf+
=DRP + fDRPoDRP
Figure 2: Model of a single node
The current state of the node is described by two variables b and c, where b is the remaining
battery of the node and c stands for the value of its credit counter. More precisely, we interpret
b as the number of packets that the node can send using its remaining energy. The initial
values of b and c are denoted by B and C, respectively. To keep the model simple, we assume
that when the node sends an own packet, c is decreased by an integer constant N > 1,
which represents the estimated number of intermediate nodes that are needed to reach the
destination. Since c must remain positive, the node can send its own packet only if c  N
holds. When the node sends a packet that was received for forwarding, c is increased by one.
In addition, each time the node sends a packet (own as well as forwarding), b is decreased by
one. When b reaches 0 (i.e., when the battery is drained out), the node stops its operation.
We assume that the initial number C of credits is not enough to drain the battery out by
sending only own packets (i.e., C=N < B).
Let us denote the number of own and forwarding packets sent during the whole lifetime
of the node by out
o
and out
f
, respectively. Selshness of the node could be represented by
the goal of maximizing out
o
subject to the following conditions:
out
o
; out
f
 0 (1)
Nout
o
  out
f
 C (2)
out
o
+ out
f
= B (3)
Condition (1) is trivial. Condition (2) describes the requirement that the number Nout
o
of credits spent by the node cannot exceed the number out
f
of credits earned plus the initial
value C of the credit counter. Finally, Condition (3) represents the fact that the initial energy
of the node must be shared between sending own packets and sending forwarding packets.
Figure 3 illustrates the conditions graphically. It is easy to see that the maximum of out
o
is
B+C
N+1
. It can also be seen that in order to reach this maximum out
f
must be
NB C
N+1
. Thus,
the node must forward this number of packets for the benet of other nodes if it wants to
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outoBB + C
N + 1
outf
B
NB - C
N + 1
- C
outo= B -outf
outo - C= Noutf
Figure 3: Maximizing out
o
maximize its own benet. If there was no credit counter and an enforcing mechanism that
does not allow the node to send an own packet when it does not have enough credits, then
Condition (2) would be missing, and the maximum of out
o
would be B. This means that the
node would maximize its own benet by dropping all packets received for forwarding.
In principle, the node can always reach out
o
=
B+C
N+1
: When it runs out of credits, it can
simply buer its own packets until it forwards enough packets and earns enough credits to
send them. However, this works only if the buer is large enough and no delay constraint is
imposed on the packets. In real-time applications, sending a packet that has spent too much
time in the buer may be useless, which means that the node must drop some of its own
packets. It can still reach out
o
=
B+C
N+1
, but it is now important how many own packets it
must drop meanwhile.
In order to study this situation, we extend our model in the following way: We assume
that the node generates own packets with a constant average rate r
o
, and receives packets for
forwarding with a constant average rate r
f
. We denote the time when the battery is drained
out by t
end
. Note that t
end
is not a constant, since the time when the battery is drained out
depends on the behavior of the node. Furthermore, we assume that there is no buering of
own packets, which means that an own packet that cannot be sent immediately (due to the
low value of the credit counter) must be dropped.
Selshness of the node could now be represented by the goal of maximizing out
o
and, at
the same time, maximizing z
o
=
out
o
r
o
t
end
(which is equivalent to minimizing the number of own
packets dropped) subject to the following conditions:
out
o
; out
f
 0 (4)
out
o
 r
o
t
end
(5)
out
f
 r
f
t
end
(6)
Nout
o
  out
f
 C (7)
out
o
+ out
f
= B (8)
Using out
f
= B   out
o
from Condition (8), we can reduce the number of unknowns and
obtain the following set of conditions:
out
o
 0 (9)
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out
o
 B (10)
t
end

out
o
r
o
(11)
t
end
  
out
o
r
f
+
B
r
f
(12)
out
o

B +C
N + 1
(13)
Conditions (9-13) determine the feasible region, on which we have to maximize out
o
and
z
o
. This is illustrated in Figure 4. As we have already seen, the maximum of out
o
is
B+C
N+1
.
Note that
B+C
N+1
is always less than B, because we assumed that C=N < B. Dierent values of
z
o
are represented by lines with dierent slopes all going through the (0,0) point. In order to
nd the maximum of z
o
, we have to nd the line with the smallest slope that still intersects
the feasible region.
outoB
ro rf+
ro B
B + C
N + 1
feasible region
( a )
z   =
 1
o
outo
ro
endt = 
outo
rf
+
B
rf
_
endt = 
endt 
outoB
ro rf+
ro B
B + C
N + 1
fe
as
ib
le
 r
eg
io
n
( b )
z   =
 1
o
z   
< 1
o
outo
rf
+
B
rf
_
endt = 
outo
ro
endt = 
endt 
Figure 4: Maximizing out
o
and z
o
=
out
o
r
o
t
end
Depending on the ratio r
f
=r
o
of the rates, we can distinguish the following two cases
(Figure 4 parts (a) and (b)):
1. If
r
f
r
o

NB C
B+C
(i.e.,
B+C
N+1

r
o
r
o
+r
f
B) then the maximum of z
o
is 1. Because of Condi-
tion (11), this is the best that can be achieved. This means that in this case, the node
does not have to drop any of its own packets.
2. If
r
f
r
o
<
NB C
B+C
(i.e.,
B+C
N+1
<
r
o
r
o
+r
f
B), then the maximum of z
o
is
r
f
r
o
B+C
NB C
< 1. This
means that in this case, the node must drop some of its own packets.
Intuitively, the dierence between the two cases above can be explained as follows: In
case 1, packets for forwarding arrive with high enough a rate to cover the expenses of sending
own packets. On the other hand, in case 2, the arrival rate of forwarding packets is too low,
and the node cannot earn enough credits to send all of its own packets even if it forwards all
packets received for forwarding.
The above analysis shows what the node can achieve in terms of maximizing its own
benet. However, it does not shed light on how the node should actually behave in order to
reach this theoretical optimum. It seems reasonable that the node should always send its own
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packets whenever this is possible (i.e., whenever it has enough credits to do so). But how
should the node decide whether to forward or to drop a packet received for forwarding?
In order to get an insight into this question, let us consider the following four forwarding
rules, where f denotes the number of forwarding packets sent so far:
Rule 1: if f <
NB C
N+1
then forward
else drop
Rule 2: if f <
NB C
N+1
then
if c  C then forward
else forward with probability C=c or drop with probability 1 C=c
else drop
Rule 3: if f <
NB C
N+1
then
if c  C then forward
else drop
else drop
Rule 4: if f <
NB C
N+1
then
if c  C then forward with probability 1  c=C or drop with probability c=C
else drop
else drop
In all four rules, packets are dropped after the threshold f =
NB C
N+1
has been reached. The
reason is that in this case, it is not necessary to forward more packets, because the node has
enough credits to drain its battery out by sending only its own packets. The four rules dier
in what happens before this threshold is reached. In Rule 1, packets are always forwarded. In
the other rules, the forwarding decision depends on the current value c of the credit counter.
In Rule 2, packets are forwarded for sure if c  C, and with decreasing probability as c
increases if c > C. In Rule 3, packets are forwarded for sure if c  C, and they are always
dropped if c > C. In Rule 4, packets are forwarded with decreasing probability as c increases
if c  C, and they are always dropped if c > C. Clearly, the most cooperative rule is Rule 1.
Rules 2, 3, and 4 are less cooperative, in this order.
We studied the performance of the rules by means of simulation. We implemented the
above described model of a single node in plain C++ language. In our simulations, we set
the values of the parameters as follows: B = 100000, C = 100, N = 5. Both the own packets
and the packets for forwarding were generated according to a Poisson process. The average
generation rate of the own packets were 0.2 packets per second, and we varied the average
generation rate of forwarding packets between 0.6 and 1.6 packets per second with a step size
of 0.2 (i.e., we varied r
f
=r
o
between 3 and 8 with a step size of 1, in order to obtain some
results for the
r
f
r
o
<
NB C
B+C
 5 case as well as for the
r
f
r
o

NB C
B+C
case). The simulations
lasted until the node drained its battery out (i.e., 100000 packets were sent). We run the
simulation 8 times for every conguration and took the average of the results obtained. Each
rule reached out
f
= 16683 =
j
B+C
N+1
k
in every run of the simulation. The values obtained for
z
o
are depicted in Figure 5.
It can be seen that Rule 4 achieves the worst performance as it is the furthest from the
theoretical optimum. The rst three rules perform almost equally well when r
f
=r
o
< 5 and
r
f
=r
o
> 5. However, a remarkable dierence appears among the rules when r
f
=r
o
= 5 = N .
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Figure 5: Comparison of the forwarding rules
Interestingly enough, the results show that the most cooperative the rule is the best the
performance that it achieves. This means that if the node wants to maximize out
o
and z
o
at
the same time, then the best forwarding rule is Rule 1 (i.e., to always forward).
Figure 6 is meant to provide an intuitive explanation for this phenomenon. Parts (a) and
(b) of the gure illustrate the operation of Rules 1 and 3, respectively, when
r
f
r
o

NB C
B+C
.
The gure should be interpreted in the following way: Let us assume that time is divided into
small time slots. Each small grey rectangle in the gure represents the set of possible points
that the node can potentially reach in a given time slot assuming that it is in the bottom-left
corner of the rectangle at the beginning of that time slot. Therefore, the ratio of the sides of
the rectangles is r
f
=r
o
. The arrows show which points are actually reached by the node when
Rules 1 and 3 are used. The dark vertical bars represent the amount of dropped forwarding
packets in the time slots.
It can be seen that by using Rule 1, the node tends to get further from the edge of
the feasible region that is represented by the out
f
= Nout
o
  C line. This means that the
node has usually more credits in reserve when Rule 1 is used. This property turns out to
be advantageous when the ratio r
f
=r
o
is close to N . The reason is that, due to the random
manner in which the packets arrive, there is always a small uctuation in the ratio of the
number of forwarding packets to the number of own packets. On average, this ratio is equal
to r
f
=r
o
, but sometimes it can be less. If this happens and r
f
=r
o
is close to N , then the node
does not receive enough forwarding packets to cover the cost of sending its own packets. In
this case, it must use the credits that it has in reserve. By increasing the credit reserve, Rule 1
decreases the probability of temporarily running out of credits and dropping own packets.
3 Protection
Clearly, the stimulating mechanism described in the previous section must be secured and
protected against various attacks. For instance, one has to prevent the user of the node from
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outoB
outf
B
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outo= B -outf
outo - C= Noutf
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outoB
outf
B
- C
outo= B -outf
outo - C= Noutf
( b )
Figure 6: Operation of Rule 1 (a) and Rule 3 (b) when
r
f
r
o

NB C
B+C
manipulating (typically increasing) her credit counter in an illegitimate way. In addition, one
has to ensure that the credit counter is increased only if a forwarding packet has indeed been
forwarded. We address these and similar issues in this section.
3.1 Tamper resistant security module
In order to prevent the user from illegitimately increasing its own credit counter, we require
that the credit counter is maintained by a trusted and tamper resistant hardware module
in each node. We call this module security module. One can imagine a security module as
a smart card (similar to the SIM card in GSM phones) or as a tamper resistant security
co-processor. For more information on tamper resistant modules, we refer to [14, 2].
We assume that the security modules are manufactured by a limited number of trusted
manufacturers. Furthermore, since the security module is tamper resistant, its behavior
cannot be modied. Therefore, security modules are trusted for always functioning correctly.
Our design approach is to put the critical functions in the security module, and the
rest of the functions in the node itself. Of course, the functions that are not placed in
the security module can be tampered with, and thus, the behavior of the node can still be
modied. However, our design ensures that no advantages can be gained by tampering with
the unprotected functions, and therefore, the user of the node will not be interested in this
activity.
3.2 Public-key infrastructure
We assume that each security module has a private key and a corresponding public key [12].
The private key is stored in the security module and kept secret. The public key is certied by
the manufacturer of the security module and the certicate is stored in the security module.
In addition, we assume that the manufacturers cross-certify the public keys of each other,
and each security module stores the public-key certicates of all manufacturers issued by the
manufacturer of the security module. Finally, we assume that each security module stores an
authentic copy of the public key of its manufacturer, which is loaded in the module securely
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at manufacturing time. Note that storing all these certicates is feasible, because we limit
the number of manufacturers.
In this system, each security module can easily obtain the authentic public key of any
other security module in the network. Let us suppose, for instance, that A wants to obtain
the public key of B. B can simply send its public-key certicate to A, who can verify it
with the public key of the manufacturer of B. A possesses an authentic copy of this public
key, since it stores the authentic public-key certicates of all manufacturers issued by its own
manufacturer.
Our system is a rather pragmatic solution for the reliable distribution of public keys, and
we had to limit the number of manufacturers in order for it to work. The design of a general
purpose public-key infrastructure for large, self-organizing ad hoc networks is a challenging
problem that is beyond the scope of this paper. An approach towards the solution of this
problem is described in [10].
3.3 Security associations
When two nodes become neighbors, their security modules establish a security association. If
this fails, the security modules do not consider each other neighbors.
A security association between two neighboring security modules A and B is represented,
at A's side, by
 the unique identier of B;
 the unique identier of the node that hosts B,
 a symmetric session key k
AB
;
 two sequence numbers c
A!B
and c
A B
, which are called sending and receiving sequence
numbers, respectively; and
 a counter pc
B@A
, which is called pending credit counter.
At B's side, the same association is represented by
 the unique identier of A;
 the unique identier of the node that hosts A;
 the session key k
AB
;
 a sending sequence number c
B!A
and a receiving sequence number c
B A
, such that
initially, c
B!A
> c
A B
and c
B A
< c
A!B
; and
 a pending credit counter pc
A@B
.
The session key k
AB
is used to compute a message authentication code, which protects
the integrity and ensures the authenticity of the packets sent between the nodes of A and B,
but k
AB
can also be used to provide other security functions (e.g., link-by-link encryption of
the content of the packets). The sequence numbers are used to detect replayed packets. The
pending credit counter pc
B@A
is used to accumulate credits at A that are due to B. Similarly,
pc
A@B
counts the credits at B that are due to A. The way in which the session key, the
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sequence numbers, and the pending credit counters are used will be explained in more detail
in the next subsection, where we present the envisioned packet forwarding protocol.
The security associations between the security modules are established using some public-
key cryptographic protocol, which is executed through the nodes that host the security mod-
ules. The security modules obtain each other's public key according to the model of the above
described public-key infrastructure.
3.4 Packet forwarding protocol
The packet forwarding protocol described in this subsection assumes that the security module
runs the routing algorithm used in the network.
If a node P has an own packet to send, it must rst pass the packet to its security module
A. A estimates the number n of intermediate nodes needed to reach the destination. Precise
estimation of this number is not so critical. If the value of the credit counter maintained by
A is less than n, then A rejects the packet. Otherwise the credit counter is decreased by n,
and the protocol continues.
Using the routing algorithm, A determines the next intermediate security module B to-
ward the destination, and retrieves the security association that corresponds to B from its
internal database. Then, it takes the session key k
AB
and the sending sequence number c
A!B
,
and generates a security header for the packet, which contains A, B, c
A!B
, and the output
h(k
AB
; A; B; c
A!B
; packet) of a publicly known keyed cryptographic hash function h. After
this computation, c
A!B
is increased by one.
Finally, A outputs the security header and the identier of the next intermediate node Q
(obtained from the data that represents the security association between A and B), and P
can send the packet together with the security header to Q.
Now, let us assume that node Q received a packet with a security header for forwarding
from node P . If Q wants to forward the packet in order to earn a credit, then Q must pass the
packet with the attached security header to its security module B. B takes the identier of the
security module A that generated the security header from the header itself, and retrieves the
corresponding security association from its internal database. Then, it veries if the sending
sequence number in the security header is greater than its receiving sequence number c
B A
.
If this is the case, then the packet is not a replay. Then, it veries the received value of the
keyed cryptographic hash function h. If the value is correct, then it accepts the packet, and
updates c
B A
to the value of the sequence number received in the security header.
If the node that hosts A (known to B from the data that represents the security association
between B and A) is not the originator of the packet (i.e., if it is an intermediate node),
then B increases the pending credit counter pc
A@B
by one. Finally, B determines the next
intermediate security module towards the destination, and generates a new security header
for the packet, much in the same way as described earlier, using the security association that
corresponds to the next intermediate security module.
3.5 Credit synchronization protocol
As it can be seen from the description of the packet forwarding protocol, when an intermediate
node forwards a packet, its credit counter is not increased immediately. Instead, the security
module of the next node increases the pending credit counter that it maintains for the rst
node. For clearing, the security modules regularly run a credit synchronization protocol, in
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which they transfer the pending credits, and reset the pending credit counters to 0. This
mechanism ensures that the node is rewarded for the packet forwarding only if it really
forwarded the packet.
It may happen that the nodes move out of each other's power range by the next time their
security modules want to run the credit synchronization protocol. If this happens, the pending
credit counters are reset to 0, and the pending credits are lost. Therefore, the mechanism
does not guarantee that the node receives its credit for every forwarded packet. We will study
the consequences of this in the next section.
3.6 Robustness
The protection mechanism described above is robust and resists against various attacks. The
credit counter is protected from illegitimate manipulations by the tamper resistance of the
security module. A security header is attached to each packet, which contains a message
authentication code that protects the integrity of the packet and the data in the security
header. This is important, because the security modules manipulate the credit counters
based on the data received in the security header. Replay of packets is prevented by the use
of an ever increasing sequence number. Moreover, the node is rewarded for packet forwarding
only if it really forwarded a packet.
We should mention, however, that there is a subtle attack that our scheme may not always
prevent in its current form. It is possible to construct a fake node that has two or more security
modules. Such a node could bounce a packet back and forth between its security modules, and
earn credits without actually transmitting anything. The full understanding of this attack and
the design of the proper countermeasure are on our research agenda. However, we can already
make the following observations: First, this attack would not always work, since routing is
performed by the security modules, which means that the next intermediate security module
is determined by the security module and not the node. In other words, the security module
may output a security header for the packet that will not be accepted by the other security
module of the node. To avoid this, the node may falsify routing information that is exchanged
between the security modules, but this can be prevented by using appropriate cryptographic
techniques. Second, such a fake node would be more expensive than a normal one, since it
has two or more legitimate security modules. Whether the benet obtained by using such a
fake node is worth the increased cost is an open question.
3.7 Overhead
We must admit that our protection mechanism adds some computational overhead to the
system, which is mainly related to the use of cryptographic operations. This issue has two
aspects: cryptographic operations need energy and time to be performed. Regarding energy
consumption, we note that the energy required to perform computation is negligible when
compared to the energy required to perform transmission. As mentioned in [15], when two
nodes communicate in BPSK at 1 GHz carrier frequency with 10
 6
error probability, have an
antenna elevation of 1/2 wavelength with fourth-power distance loss, Raleigh fading, and an
ideal receiver, then the energy cost of transmitting 1 Kb over a distance of 100 meters is ap-
proximately 3 joules. By contrast, a general purpose processor with 100 MIPS/W power could
eciently execute 300 million instructions for the same amount of energy. This means that
the execution of our cryptographic operations have a negligible energy cost when compared
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to the transmission cost.
Regarding time, we note that the only time critical operations are the generation and
the verication of the security header for every packet and for every hop. However, these
require only cryptographic hash function computations, which can be done very eciently.
Moreover, the security header is processed by the security module; to some extent, this can
be accomplished in parallel with the processing performed by the main processor of the node.
Another issue is the communication overhead, which is due to the establishment of the
security associations, the size of the security header, and the periodic execution of the credit
synchronization protocol. In order to reduce this overhead, the establishment of the security
associations could be integrated with the neighbor discovery protocol that the nodes usually
have to run anyhow in mobile ad hoc networks, and the credit synchronization interval should
be appropriately chosen. Finally, assuming that the identiers of the security modules are 8
bytes long, the sequence numbers are 4 bytes long, and the output of the cryptographic hash
function used is 16 bytes long (e.g., if MD5 [12] is used), we get that the security header is
36 bytes long. Considering the usual size of payloads in wireless networks, this seems to be
an acceptable overhead.
4 Simulations
In Section 2, we studied the proposed stimulation mechanism through the analysis of a simpli-
ed model, and showed convincing arguments that it indeed stimulates packet forwarding in
that model. In order to study the proposed stimulation mechanism in a more general setting,
which is closer to the reality of mobile ad hoc networks, we conducted simulations of a full
network written in plain C++ language. In this section, we describe our simulator, and the
results that we obtained.
4.1 Simulation description
The simulated networks are composed of 100 nodes that are placed randomly (uniformly)
on a 500 m  500 m rectangle. Each node has the same power range of 120 m. The
nodes move according to the random waypoint mobility model [5]. In this model, the node
randomly chooses a destination point in space and moves towards this point with a randomly
chosen constant speed. When it reaches the chosen destination, it stops and waits there for
a randomly chosen time. Then, it chooses a new destination and speed, and starts to move
again. These steps are repeated until the end of the simulation. In our simulations, the
nodes choose their speed between 1 m/s and 3 m/s uniformly. The pause time is generated
according to the exponential distribution. The average pause time is 60 s.
We do not use any particular MAC layer algorithm. Instead, we model the MAC layer by
randomly choosing the packet transmission time between neighbors for each packet and for
each hop. The average packet transmission time between neighbors is 10 ms. Packet trans-
mission errors occur with 0.1 probability. If an error occurred, the packet is re-transmitted
after a 1 s timeout. When the node is busy with packet transmission, it can still receive
packets, which are placed in a buer, and served when the previous packet transmission is
nished.
For routing, we use a geodesic packet forwarding algorithm developed within the context
of the Terminodes Project, and described in [3]. However, we considerably simplied the
original algorithm in order to ease the implementation of its simulator. This does not aect
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our results, since we are not interested in the performance of the packet forwarding algorithm
itself. The simplied geodesic packet forwarding algorithm works in the following way: We
assume that each node knows its own geographic position and the geographic positions of its
neighbors. Furthermore, the source of a packet knows the current geographic position of the
destination. The way in which this information is obtained is not simulated. Before sending
the packet, the source puts the coordinates of the destination in the header of the packet.
Then, it determines which of its neighbors is the closest to the destination, and sends the
packet to this neighbor. When a node receives a packet for forwarding, it rst veries if the
destination is its neighbor. If this is the case, then it forwards the packet to the destination.
Otherwise, it determines which of its neighbors is the closest to the destination, and sends
the packet to this neighbor. This is possible, because the packet header contains the believed
coordinates of the destination. If the forwarding node does not have any neighbor that is
closer to the destination than the node itself, then the packet is dropped
1
. In our simulations,
because of the rather high density and the rather low speed mobility of the nodes, packet
drops of this kind almost never happened .
Energy consumption of the nodes is not simulated. For this reason, the size of the packets
is not important for us. Therefore, we assume that each packet has the same size, and we
focus only on the number of packets that are generated, sent, forwarded, and delivered.
Each node generates packets according to a Poisson process. The destination of each
packet is chosen randomly (uniformly). In our reference simulation, the average packet gen-
eration rate was 0.2 pkt/s, but we also ran simulations with average packet generation rates
of 0.5 and 0.8 pkt/s.
The initial value C of the credit counter of each node is 100. When a node i sends an
own packet to a node d that is not the neighbor of i, the credit counter of i is decreased by
n. Unlike in the simple model of Section 2, n is not a constant, but computed according to
the following formula:
n =

distance(i; d)
power range

  1
This gives a lower bound on the number of intermediate nodes needed to reach the destination.
When a node forwards a packet, its pending credit counter at the next node is increased by
one. In our reference simulation, the credits of each node are synchronized in every 5 s, but
we also ran simulations with credit synchronization intervals of 10, 15, and 20 s.
We always ran 8 simulations for a given simulation setting, and considered the average
of the obtained values for each observed variable. In each run, 2 hours of network operation
were simulated.
We listed the values of the main simulation parameters for an overview in Table 1.
4.2 Simulation results
4.2.1 Comparison of forwarding rules
In the rst set of simulations, our goal was to determine which of Rule 1, Rule 2, or Rule 3 is
the most benecial for the nodes in terms of maximizing z
o
. We did not use Rule 4, because
it performed much worse than the other three rules in the single node model of Section 2.
1
This simplication is true only in our simulation setting. The complete geodesic packet forwarding algo-
rithm described in [3] can cope with such a situation.
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Parameter Value
Space 500 m  500 m
Number of nodes 100
Power range 120 m
Mobility model random waypoint
Speed 1 m/s { 3 m/s
Average pause time 60 s
Packet generation rate 0.2 (0.5, 0.8) pkt/s
Choice of destination random
Routing geodesic packet forwarding
Initial number of credits (C) 100
Credit synchronization interval 5 (10, 15, 20) s
Simulation time 7200 s
Table 1: Value of the main simulation parameters
Since battery usage is not taken into consideration in our simulations, we had to modify the
rules as follows:
Rule 1': always forward
Rule 2': if c  C then forward
else forward with probability C=c or drop with probability 1  C=c
Rule 3': if c  C then forward
else drop
Our approach to determine which of these rules is the best was the following: We set 90%
of the nodes to use a given rule (we call this the majority rule), and the remaining 10% of the
nodes to use rst Rule 1', then Rule 2', and nally Rule 3'. We observed the average value of
z
o
that the 10% of the nodes could achieve in each cases. We repeated the above experiment
for packet generation rates of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 pkt/s. The results are depicted in Figures 7,
8, and 9.
Remarkably, Rule 1' performed the best in every case. This means that the 10% deviating
nodes achieve the highest z
o
(i.e., drop the smallest portion of their own packets) when they use
Rule 1', no matter whether the 90% of the nodes use Rule 1', Rule 2', or Rule 3'. Furthermore,
this is true for every packet generation rate that we have simulated. Therefore, our conclusion
is that the proposed stimulation mechanism indeed stimulates packet forwarding, and not only
in the simple model of Section 2, but in a much more general setting too.
4.2.2 The eect of less cooperative nodes on the throughput of the network
In the second set of simulations, our goal was to study the eect of less cooperative nodes
on the throughput of the network when the proposed stimulation mechanism is used. As
opposed to the simulation that yielded Figure 1, in which we assumed that some nodes
fully deny packet forwarding, here we assumed that some nodes use the least cooperative
forwarding rule (i.e., Rule 3'). The rational is that full denial of packet forwarding quickly
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Figure 7: Comparison of the forwarding rules when the packet generation rate is 0.2 pkt/s
results in running out of credits, and thus, dropping own packets, and therefore, it is not
benecial at all for the nodes. On the other hand, Rule 3' can be viewed as a trade-o, where
the node can send a large portion of its own packets, and it forwards only a small number of
packets that is necessary to cover its expenses.
In this experiment, our approach was the following: We rst set all the nodes to cooperate
(i.e., to use Rule 1'), and then progressively increased the fraction of less cooperative nodes
(i.e., the fraction of nodes that use Rule 3'). In order for the results to be comparable with the
results shown in Figure 1, we ran simulations with networks of 100, 200, 300, and 400 nodes
but with the same node density. We observed the cumulative throughput of the network,
which is dened as the ratio of the total number of packets delivered to the total number of
packets sent. The results are shown in Figure 10.
It can be seen that the throughput of the network decreases as the fraction of less coop-
erative nodes increases, but far less dramatically than in Figure 1. Even if all the nodes use
Rule 3', the throughput is around 0.9.
The value of this experiment is that it shows that the network can tolerate less cooperative
nodes quite well. A node may tend to be less cooperative, when it is about to run out of
battery. In this case, it may not be benecial to use Rule 1', and in this way, increase the
credit reserve, because those credits cannot be used if the battery becomes empty. Therefore,
the node may decide to use a less cooperative forwarding rule, or even to drop all forwarding
packets. However, we note that the battery can usually be reloaded, and the accumulated
credits can be used again. For this reason, it is not clear at all whether using a less cooperative
rule when running out of battery is a good strategy or not. Nevertheless, the results of the
above experiment show that the network would be able to cope with this situation.
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Figure 8: Comparison of the forwarding rules when the packet generation rate is 0.5 pkt/s
4.2.3 Variation of the average credit level in the network
In a third set of simulations, our goal was to study how the average credit level in the network
is eected by the number of less cooperative nodes and by the size of the credit synchronization
interval. To this end, we observed how the average credit level in the network varies in time
as we increase the fraction of less cooperative nodes and as we increase the size of the credit
synchronization interval. The results are shown in Figures 11 and 12.
When most of the nodes are cooperative, the average credit level in the network shows
an increasing tendency. This is because the formula that we use to determine the number of
intermediate nodes needed to reach a given destination under-estimates the actual number.
This means that if a packet is delivered, then the joint credit income of the intermediate
nodes is usually higher than the expenses of the source of the packet. Furthermore, when
more nodes use Rule 1', packets are delivered with a higher probability, and thus, the average
credit level increases more rapidly.
When less cooperative nodes are in majority, the average credit level in the network
decreases. However, this decrease slows down, and after some time, it stops, and the average
credit level becomes constant. The intuitive explanation is the following: When the nodes
use Rule 3', their forwarding decisions depend on the current value of their credit counters.
At the beginning, the average credit level is high, and packets are often dropped before they
reach their destinations. This results in a decrease of the average credit level in the network.
At the same time, the probability of dropping a packet due to the usage of Rule 3' also
decreases, since the nodes have less credits in general, and they are more willing to forward.
Therefore, more and more packets are delivered, and the decrease of the average credit level
slows down. After some time, the decreasing eect of using Rule 3' (i.e., dropping packets)
and the increasing eect of under-estimating the actual number of intermediate nodes needed
to reach a given destination equalize each other, and the system attains an equilibrium. The
fact that this equilibrium is below the initial value C = 100 of the credit counters explains why
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Figure 9: Comparison of the forwarding rules when the packet generation rate is 0.8 pkt/s
the throughput of the network is around 0.9 even if all the nodes use Rule 3' (see Figure 10).
The reason is that in the equilibrium, most of the nodes have less than C credits (note that
none of the nodes has more than C credits because of Rule 3'), and therefore, most of the
nodes are willing to forward.
The eect of the credit synchronization interval on the average credit level in the network
is not surprising: The larger the credit synchronization interval is, the slower the increase of
the average credit level in the network is. Moreover, when the credit synchronization interval
is 20 s, the average credit level continuously decreases in time. The reason is that when the
credit synchronization interval is large, the probability that the neighbors of a node move
away by the time of the next run of the credit synchronization protocol is high, and thus, the
number of credits lost in the system is also high.
If mobility exhibits some locality properties, then this problem can be alleviated by slightly
modifying the credit synchronization protocol, and letting the security module keep the ac-
cumulated pending credits for a given neighboring node in memory (until this memory is not
needed for other purposes) even if that node has moved away and is not a neighbor anymore.
In this case, because of the locality of mobility, nodes that were neighbors in the past may
become neighbors again with a higher probability, which means that there are good chances
that the pending credits can be cleared some time in the near future.
In any case, the size of the credit synchronization interval must be carefully chosen. If
it is too small, then the credit synchronization protocol is run too often, which leads to a
considerable overhead. However, if it is too large, then the average credit level in the network
may become too low. Therefore, one has to nd an appropriate trade-o.
An approach to limit the variation of the average credit level in the network would be
to reset the credit counter to a reference value regularly. For instance, it could be reset
each time the battery is reloaded. However, the security module, which maintains the credit
counter, may not have reliable information about the battery reload events. On the other
hand, since it maintains the credit counter, it can pretty well estimate the number of packets
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Figure 10: Eect of less cooperative nodes on the throughput of the network
sent by the node by observing the credit incomes and expenses. Thus, it can reset the credit
counter after a given number of packets has been sent. This would eliminate the problem of
ever increasing or ever decreasing average credit level in the network. However, it is not yet
clear to us, what the consequences of this resetting mechanism are on the performance of the
dierent forwarding rules. In particular, it seems, that in this case, the node's goal is not
only maximizing z
o
, but at the same time, it may want to minimize its credit loss due to the
resetting mechanism. It is an open question which forwarding rule would be the best with
respect to this new goal.
5 Related work
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two papers addressing the problem of non-
cooperating nodes in mobile ad hoc networks: [11] and our previous paper [6]. The authors of
[11] consider the case in which some malicious nodes agree to forward packets but fail to do
so. In order to cope with this problem, they propose two mechanisms: a watchdog, in charge
of identifying the misbehaving nodes, and a pathrater, in charge of dening the best route
avoiding these nodes.
The paper shows that these two mechanisms make it possible to maintain the total
throughput of the network at an acceptable level, even in the presence of a high amount of
misbehaving nodes. However, the problem is that the selshness of the nodes does not seem
to be castigated; on the contrary, by the combination of the watchdog and the pathrater, the
misbehaving nodes will not be bothered by the transit trac while still enjoying the possi-
bility to send and to receive packets. The proposed mechanisms could be enriched in such a
way that a misbehaving node would be locked out by its neighbors. However, this possibility
could be exploited to mount denial of service attacks.
In [6], we addressed the same problem as in this paper, and proposed a stimulation
mechanism that is based on a virtual currency, called nuglets. Nuglets are used to pay for
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Figure 11: The eect of less cooperative nodes on the average credit level in the network
packet forwarding. We proposed two payment models for this purpose. In the Packet Purse
Model, the source of the packet pays by loading some nuglets in the packet before sending it.
Intermediate nodes acquire some nuglets from the packet when they forward it. If the packet
runs out of nuglets, then it is dropped. In the Packet Trade Model, the packet does not carry
nuglets, but it is traded for nuglets by intermediate nodes: Each intermediate node \buys" it
from the previous one for some nuglets, and \sells" it to the next one (or to the destination)
for more nuglets. In this way, each forwarding node earns some nuglets, and the total cost of
forwarding the packet is covered by the destination.
A serious disadvantage of the Packet Trade Model is that it allows overloading of the
network, since the sources do not have to pay. For this reason, mainly the Packet Purse
Model has been studied. However, the Packet Purse Model has a problem too: it seems to be
dicult to estimate the number of nuglets that the source should put in the packet initially.
If the source under-estimates this number, then the packet will be discarded with a high
probability, and the source loses its investment. The source may over-estimate the number,
but this leads to a rapid decrease of the total number of nuglets in the system due to the
dropping of packets (for networking reasons) with many nuglets inside.
The mechanism proposed in this paper overcomes this estimation problem, because the
packets do not need to carry credits. At the same time, the property of refraining users
from overloading the network is retained. Otherwise, the two mechanisms have a very similar
avor, just like their protection schemes.
6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we addressed the problem of stimulating cooperation in self-organizing, mobile
ad hoc networks for civilian applications, where the nodes are assumed to be \selsh", meaning
that they try to maximize the benets that they get from the network, while minimizing their
contribution to it. We focused on a particular instance of this problem, namely, stimulating
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Figure 12: The eect of the credit synchronization interval on the average credit level in the
network
packet forwarding. Our approach is based on a counter, called credit counter, in each node.
Besides stimulating packet forwarding, the proposed mechanism encourages the users to keep
their nodes turned on and to refrain from sending a large amount of packets to distant
destinations.
In order to protect the proposed mechanism against misuse, we presented a scheme based
on a trusted and tamper resistant hardware module, called security module, in each node,
which generates cryptographically protected security headers for packets and maintains the
credit counters of the nodes.
It is important to understand that the proposed stimulation mechanism and the proposed
protection scheme are not intended to make misbehavior of the nodes impossible. For instance,
nodes can still deny packet forwarding, or they may bypass the security module, and send a
packet without a valid security header. What our design tries to ensure is that misbehavior is
not benecial for the nodes, and therefore, it should happen only rarely. For instance, if the
node denies packet forwarding, then it runs out of credits, and it cannot send its own packets.
Or, if the node sends a packet without a valid security header, then intermediate nodes will
be reluctant to forward it. This is because an intermediate node can earn credits with packet
forwarding only if it passes the forwarding packet to its security module. However, in the
absence of a valid security header, the security module will reject the packet.
We studied the behavior of the proposed mechanism analytically and by means of sim-
ulations. We showed convincing arguments that it indeed stimulates the nodes for packet
forwarding assuming that
 each node of the network generates packets continuously;
 generated packets cannot be buered, which means that if they cannot be sent, then
they must be dropped; and
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 selshness of the nodes is represented by the goal of dropping as few own packets as
possible.
In our future work, we intend to study the behavior of the proposed mechanism, when
these assumptions are weakened. For instance, we could allow buering of packets, but limit
the size of the buer and the time that the packets can spend in it. Or, we could allow
the nodes to generate packets in bursts instead of continuously. Finally, we would like to
study the eect of regularly resetting the credit counters to a reference value (see discussion
in Subsection 4.2.3), in which case the assumed goal of the nodes needs to be extended.
The work presented in this paper is focused on packet forwarding, as this is probably the
most fundamental function of an ad hoc network. However, we are well aware of the fact that
many other functions are required, including at the networking layer; an important example
thereof is route discovery and route repair in on-demand protocols. In our future work, we
intend to explore the way to generalize the proposed mechanism to these functions as well.
We also intend to address application-level aspects. In peer-to-peer computing, there is
a growing concern that some users might parasitically take advantage of resources provided
by others (see e.g., [1]). Some researchers have made early attempts to introduce a virtual
currency to encourage \good citizenship" (e.g., www.mojonation.net). A further, more general
ambition of our research is to explore how mechanisms like the one proposed in this paper
could be used to application-level issues. An example thereof could be the mutual provision
of information services in an ad hoc network. We believe that such aspects must be properly
addressed in order to fully take advantage of the self-organization property of ad hoc networks.
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